

After-Action Review of the Response to a Mass Shooting on the Campus



Submitted by:

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# INTRODUCTION

In April 2023, Security Risk Management Consultants, LLC (SRMC) was engaged by Michigan State University (MSU) to conduct a thorough review of the response and follow-up actions taken by the institution and other outside agencies because of the mass shooting that occurred on February 13, 2023. The objectives of this process were:

* Compile materials for review and analysis that are relevant to MSU’s emergency protocols, operational response, communications, victim, student, and employee support, continuity of operations, organizational recovery, and possible additional target hardening and physical security measures.
* Conduct interviews and focus groups with key stakeholders as appropriate.
* Research national and international promising and best practices and model policies.
* Study After-Action Reports from previous mass casualty incidents.
* Compile a comprehensive written report on our findings to include recommendations on lessons learned, promising practices, and improvement plans as they apply to the University’s initial and ongoing response to the incident.

Throughout the review process, we received excellent cooperation from every MSU administrator and staff member we interviewed. We felt these individuals were candid in sharing their opinions about security and safety programming and identifying potential issues and concerns. Their cooperation, as well as that of many others, was an essential element in helping us gain a better understanding of overall security and safety issues and how the University manages its Police Department operation.

There were expressed feelings of burnout related to previous crises, such as the ongoing COVID pandemic and the Nassar case. Recent turnover in leadership of key positions (13) was mentioned as a challenge related to the timing of this incident.

Also, during the assessment process, we received exceptional support from Marlon Lynch, Vice President and Chief Safety Officer for the University. Mr. Lynch provided “executive sponsorship” of this effort and was invaluable in coordinating schedules, meetings, and communications throughout the duration of our visit.

# METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF WORK

This assessment process was conducted by Rick Amweg, MPA, Frank A. Demes, MFA, Paul S. Denton, MBA, MSC, CSSP, CIPM, Tracy L. Hahn, MSCJ, James C. Townzen, PSP, CPP, CSC, and Kathleen Wade, Ph.D., LMSW, ACSW. The review and reporting process is based on Michigan State University’s request for an After-Action Review and Report of the response to the mass shooting that occurred on the East Lansing campus on February 13, 2023. In general terms, the analysis and report that follows centers on the following four questions:

* What was expected to happen?
* What actually occurred?
* What went well and why?
* What can be improved and how?

A key product of our After-Action Report will include best practices, mitigation efforts, security protocols, and technology recommendations in line with existing industry standards and regulations.

This process was conducted as an open, collaborative effort between SRMC and MSU. We believe that security programming in an academic setting is a delicate balance of preparations for and responses to criminal or other aberrant activities and University and community emergencies, support of institutional mission and culture, cost, and addressing perceived needs. A “systems” approach that includes the application of security technologies, appropriate policies and procedures, and the assignment of security responsibilities to various personnel and entities is required if this effort is to be successful. MSU’s security program must be consistent with the risks inherent in its campus environment and with the institution’s mission.

**SRMC’S VARIOUS ROLES**

* + ***Assessors***, identifying, categorizing, and documenting existing needs and opportunities for improvements in MSU DPPS’s policies, procedures, tactics, operations, training, security technology systems, and interagency relationships.
  + ***Investigators***, reviewing and evaluating important information regarding recognized promising practices and protocols in

responding to and recovering from a mass shooting incident.

* + ***Visionaries***, helping MSU understand industry trends in security management, best practices, and technologies.
  + ***Educators***, helping MSU to understand technology capabilities, limitations, costs, challenges, and opportunities so they can make knowledgeable, informed decisions regarding their impact on effective and efficient security operations and risk mitigation.
  + ***Planners***, identifying future trends and best practices, developing reasonable, appropriate solutions, and charting mid and long-term security programming and technology strategies aimed at strengthening MUS’s preparedness and response capabilities.
  + ***Advisors***, engaging MSU in an inclusive, collaborative process designed to best position the University to effectively determine optimal security programming going forward.

**DELIVERABLE**

A comprehensive written report on our findings. Our report will include recommendations on lessons learned, promising practices, and improvement plans as they apply to the University’s initial and ongoing response to the incident relative to:

* Policies and procedures
* Planning and preparation
* Training
* Officer safety and equipment
* Leadership, coordination, and collaboration
* Command and control
* Emergency medical and psychological care
* Internal communication, situational awareness, and intelligence
* External communications, public relations, and traditional and social media
* Interagency MOUs, support agreements and practices
* First responder wellness and mental health
* Victim and witness support
* Community relations, partnerships, and resilience
* Institutional continuity and recovery efforts
* Additional physical security measures and technologies including the application of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During a crisis, such as an active shooter event, police response can become chaotic and appear disjointed due to a convergence of factors that strain their capabilities. One primary reason is the overwhelming nature of the crisis itself. Active shooter incidents involve a sudden and unexpected surge in demand for police services, stretching the available pool of officer resources to the limit. The need to rapidly assess and adapt to the evolving situation, including using tactics that have only previously been deployed in training scenarios, while simultaneously managing communication, coordination, and decision-making, intensifies the chaos. Additionally, the unpredictability of crisis events and the inability to plan for every possible scenario makes it difficult for the larger organization~~s~~ to adequately prepare and plan, leading to an ad hoc approach that can further contribute to disorder.

While we are positive that these and other factors came into play on the evening of February 13th, our overall assessment of the initial response (that is, in the seconds after the initial call and prior to other agencies mounting a response effort) by MSU police officers is that the response was appropriate, timely, and correct. Officers proceeded directly to the last known location of violence to eliminate the threat. Those efforts continued as the second shooting location was identified.

## What Was Expected to Happen?

* A response from agencies with immediate jurisdiction.
* Notifications sent out as soon as practical by the Public Safety Department.
* Additional resources would be staged and assigned by command.
* Efforts by law enforcement personnel to identify, locate, and neutralize the active threat.
* Search, rescue, and provide aid to victims.
* Campus buildings methodically swept and cleared.
* Once all clear is given, student transport can resume.

## What Actually Occurred?

* MSU police officers immediately responded to Berkey Hall, and subsequently to the MSU Union.
* The off-site (county-managed) 9-1-1 Center immediately began coordinating calls-for-service and dispatching additional resources. East Lansing police were immediately on scene.
* Additional resources responded to the campus and on-scene incident management was initiated.

## What Went Well and Why?

* Initial handling on the 9-1-1 calls was appropriately handled. The County Dispatch Center (ICRD) (Ingram County Regional Dispatch Center) appropriately managed the influx of emergency calls related to the incident, including coordinating and dispatching fire and medic units as well as outside agencies.
  + Because of appropriate training, ICRD dispatchers and staff were able to reorganize the dispatch operation to accommodate the influx of calls for assistance and manage the number of agencies responding.
* MSU Police, the Ingham County Sheriff’s Deputies, and East Lansing Police appropriately responded to the scenes (Berkey and the Union).
  + Police officers, utilizing prior training for active shooter events, were able to seamlessly and immediately deploy into a response mode appropriate for the situation.
  + Other agencies, including Lansing Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation also provided response and/or crime scene investigation assistance during the incident.
* Responding police officers took appropriate actions to locate and eliminate any deadly threat.
  + Using prior training, officers understood their roles in locating, identifying, and eliminating the deadly threat.
* The University quickly responded with a plan to revise and enhance campus safety and security to include:
  + Extending the hours that campus buildings are accessible only to students, faculty, and staff with key cards.
  + Placing locks on the doors of the school's approximately 1,300 academic classrooms.
  + Adding more cameras to academic buildings and near the Green Light emergency phones.
  + Requiring mandatory active violent intruder training for all employees and students.
    - NOTE: The plan for active violent intruder training has been modified. It is now strongly recommended and encouraged for all employees and students but no longer mandatory.

## What Should be Improved?

* Deployment of additional security technology and implementation of the plans for a Security Operations Center within the Public Safety Department.
* Take control of self-dispatched police officers to avoid interagency confusion and public reports of unknown people with guns on and around the campus.
* Fire, EMS, and the press are typically directed to staging areas where they wait to be deployed or be given updates. There was a lack of command and control of these assets.
  + This is understood by MSUPD leadership and is mentioned in their internal AAR.
* There were people who self-deployed to help during the crisis. This included MSU staff and community providers, counselors/mental health professionals, and local clergy. Although well-intentioned, this added to the chaos.
* Procurement Services was able to secure some resources to aid in this crisis, yet there were no processes in place to identify, badge, assign roles, or control the environment.
* The Family Assistance Center was without the appropriate leadership and organization necessary to manage during the crisis.
* Our takeaway based on multiple interviews is that the Board of Trustees members wanted to help but became involved in the incident beyond the customary role and expectations of a governance board during an emergency.

We were unable to interview some law enforcement officers for this assessment, therefore we cannot speak to the involvement or participation of all responding agencies.

**CAVEAT**

In our quest to assess, understand, and comment on the actions of individuals and/or agencies on the night of February 13th, it is essential to exercise caution and mindfulness when considering and applying facts and knowledge not available to responders during the incident. Reviewing the actions of others based only on what they knew at the time is essential for several reasons:

* **Contextual Understanding:** People's decisions and actions are influenced by the information available to them at a specific moment in time. By considering their knowledge and perspective at that moment, we can better understand the reasoning behind their choices.
* **Fairness:** Recognizing the limitations of someone's knowledge allows us to be unbiased in our assessment of their actions. We strive to avoid judging outcomes that were beyond the responders’ control or were unforeseen at the time.
* **Learning and Improvement:** Analyzing decisions considering information available at the time helps us learn from the past and improve future decision-making. It allows us to look at information dissemination processes and assess if there were better strategies to get information into the hands of responders differently.
* **Avoiding Hindsight Bias:** Hindsight bias is the tendency to believe that an event was predictable or that better decisions could have been made if the same information were available. By focusing on what was known at the time, we can avoid this cognitive bias and approach the analysis objectively.
* **Respect for Complexity:** Many situations are complex, and outcomes can be influenced by numerous factors. Reviewing actions based on the available knowledge acknowledges this complexity and avoids oversimplification or reductionist thinking.
* **Fostering a Learning Culture:** Organizations that value reviewing actions based on available knowledge encourage individuals to share their experiences openly, knowing that they will be understood in the appropriate context.

While our present understanding of operations and procedures that night is informed by a holistic review of documentation and actions, we feel it is unfair and misleading to judge the actions of those first responders solely through the lens of our current knowledge.

When we judge historical actions with contemporary knowledge, we often overlook the prevailing circumstances and challenges faced by individuals or agencies at that time. In this case, like so many other active shooter events, reactions are based on:

* The current set of circumstances,
* The knowledge or belief of conditions at the time,
* The primary objective of protecting the public by eliminating the threat, and
* Ensuring that the context of the threat is fully understood.

Failure to consider these specific contexts can lead to misinterpretations and unfair assessments of actions.

In conclusion, we must be wary of judging the past solely with current knowledge and values. Reviewing actions based on what was known at the time helps us develop a nuanced understanding of decisions and behaviors, promoting fairness, empathy, and a continuous learning mindset. It enables us to avoid hasty judgments and appreciate the complexities that individuals faced in their decision-making processes.

**FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS** **BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED**

This after-action review examined the MSU response within the perspective of best practices applied and lessons learned from other mass casualty incidents. Some common themes emerge in those reports and lessons learned from other high profile active violence incidents across the US. Among the most notable are the following issues:

* Incident Response
  + Police response time
  + Incident command
  + Coordination between police and fire, administration, and EOC
  + Training
  + Underutilized or untapped resources or agencies
  + Prompt designation of staging area for mutual aid responders and self-dispatched personnel
  + EOC operations, activation, personnel, equipment, record keeping
  + Physical security in campus buildings were students, faculty or staff have sheltered
  + Active shooter active violence preparation in the university level emergency response plan
  + Threat assessment, intelligence gathering and information sharing
* Aftermath
  + Victim Services activated
    - Review the system for rapidly deploying trained professional staff to help families get information, crisis intervention, and referrals to a wide range of resources
    - What support resources are available
    - Include Victim services in emergency planning
* Family assistance processes, including properly credentialed staff
* Death notification
* Media management
  + Joint information Center concept
* Vigils or memorials
* Other events and activities that support recovery and healing

We have addressed and/or evaluated each of the above listed topics in our review and assessment. While there are areas that should be internally further evaluated (because of this report) and actions taken, overall, we believe the initial response by MSU police and other police agencies was efficient and effective. The response in no way contributed to the prolongation of the incident, nor did it contribute in any way to additional loss of life. On the contrary, although we have no definitive way of knowing, the rapid response of police may have contributed in a positive way to ending the violent acts of the assailant sooner.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES**

* Review existing policies and procedures for training and psychological care. Identify and keep current lists for deploying community support and resources in the event of a disaster.
* Some policy updates may be needed. Of note were the following:
  + FIREARMS POLICY last updated: 11/20/2001.
  + Board of Trustees policy 4.00 and subsections under Designation of Enforcement Powers, Enacted 1964, amended 1994 and 2005.

Both use the title and authority level, “Director of the Department of Police and Public Safety” which has since been changed to the newly created position of Vice President and Chief Safety Officer.

**PLANNING AND PREPARATION**

* Continue recruiting and hiring efforts to fill police officer vacancies to reach the authorized level of 75 total officers. This is important to assure that MSU Department of Public Safety uniformed Patrol Operations are sufficiently staffed to handle routine, and priority calls for service.
  + It is noted that MSU Police have recently increased staffing with three officers in the FTO program and three scheduled to enter the academy in August.
* Consider a strategic planning retreat for the Department of Public Safety management team. The goals of this retreat include team building and improving communication within the new organization structure.

**OFFICER SAFETY AND EQUIPMENT**

* Conduct training, then a Tabletop Exercise, and subsequently a Full Exercise with EOC operations, policy group, media, multiple staging areas, command post/s, and other critical entities set up for each group to visit (virtual is ok) and understand the various roles and why the groups are separated.
* Include community partners, especially public safety forces (Police, Fire, EMS) in on-site training and disaster preparedness.

**LEADERSHIP COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION**

* Provide guidance and direction to board members and ensure those in senior leadership positions and board members understand their roles and limits. If more self-involvement is desired by senior leadership, an outlet must be identified so that attention is provided only in areas that are appropriate.
* Consider training for Board members and senior leadership on the following topics:
  + Incident Management/ National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command Systems (ICS). A document containing further guidance on NIMS and ICS is included at the end of this report.
  + Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
* Include training on the role and responsibilities of an executive policy group during an emergency or disaster and within an Emergency Operation Center.
* Consider training for the Board of Trustees on their role in an emergency or disaster.
* Consider a Board of Trustee policy on crisis management and communication. An example is provided from the University of Maryland System at the following link. <https://www.usmd.edu/regents/bylaws/SectionVIII/VIII-21.00.pdf>
* Consider an annual exercise for Executive Level personnel and key team member(s)

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

* Take control of self-dispatched police officers who simply show up at the scene. This will help avoid interagency confusion and public reports of unknown people with guns on and around campus.
  + Ideally, responding police officers outside of their primary jurisdiction would have been staged in a large parking lot where an MSU official could ensure that their presence was documented, and their affiliation noted.
  + Individuals with a potential personal connection to anyone involved in the incident should be excluded from the assignment.
  + Police officers being detailed to other locations should be briefed on their specific role and who they report to, and their method of communication should be logged.
* Determine a process for designating a person to be in charge during an absence (depth chart/succession planning).
* Consider training and exercises for public safety leadership on implementing a unified command.
* Ensure that the SOC members are trained in Unified Command. Coordination with Regional Dispatch is critical to your success.
* Conduct training and exercise for supervisory and command levels on staging area operations.
* Ensure that plans and protocols related to EOC activation are understood across all levels of the institution. This should be reinforced with training and exercise that include the executive level policy group
* Ensure alternate external EOC locations are identified, and virtual capabilities are in place and routinely included in exercises.
* Ensure departmental operations centers are defined and understood as being different from the campus Emergency Operations Center.
* Ensure that a security detail is assigned immediately upon activation of the EOC. This includes screening and logging of all persons reporting to the EOC
* Ensure emergency management plans include fiscal accountability to track expenses related to the emergency incident. This may include more than operational costs to resolve the incident but recovery insurance claims and medical expenses.
* Consider adding a Transportation Branch in the EOC as a matter of routine operations.
* Ensure a security detail is assigned to the Family Assistance Center (preferably staffed by campus public safety personnel) to ensure only authorized people are permitted access.
* Include a credentialling system or list of persons specifically authorized to enter the Family Assistance Center during an emergency.
* There should be a log of people who report to the center for help that can be shared with the Unified Command, EOC, and other police officials if needed.
* If individuals must move from or through the “hot zone” to get to the Family Assistance Center, ensure there is a clear escort or transportation plan. Note that in this incident, bus service was provided.

**INTERNAL COMMUNICATION, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AND INTELLIGENCE**

* Ensure there is a means of receiving emergency notification messages in work areas where phones or personal devices are prohibited.

**EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND TRADITIONAL AND SOCIAL MEDIA**

* Additional emergency messages and/or updates should be considered given the extended time the campus was in a “lock- down” condition.

**INTERAGENCY MOUS, SUPPORT AGREEMENTS, AND PRACTICES**

* Consider designating a liaison to local law enforcement and emergency management agencies to help coordinate training, exercises, planning, and operations.

**EMERGENCY MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE**

* The Family Assistance Center, under the auspices of Student Life and Engagement, in conjunction with the Office of Recovery (newly established 4/1/23), EAP, CAPS, and Psychology Clinic, can provide specific training sessions in areas such as Psychological First Aid (PFA) or other crisis and trauma-related training to staff and volunteers to be available in such an event. Understanding trauma and how to respond to different types of disasters is essential in any disaster plan. Whether it is responding to students, faculty, staff, or first responders, a comprehensive plan identifying what resources are needed, and who has been trained and can provide them is an important part of an emergency plan.

**FIRST RESPONDER WELLNESS AND MENTAL HEALTH**

* Consider a non-denominational lead clergy representative, preferably someone known in the community who can provide leadership, assign roles, and manage their fellow clergy during an emergency.
* Develop a credentialing process for disaster responders who provide support and mental health services. Create a list of providers, training, and availability in the event of a disaster (depending on what is required).

**VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT**

* With respect to death notifications:
  + Ensure there is clarity between Police and Student Life as to who and when death notifications are made. This is particularly important if there is a criminal investigation.
  + Provide separate space for individual families, when possible, particularly those waiting for official notification.
  + Consider a cross-functional team approach for death notifications, with membership representation from Student Life, Public Safety investigators, counselors, and the medical examiner’s office. Train and practice as a team.
  + Employees with personal connections with the deceased should not be permitted or expected to make the death notification.
  + University staff with senior leadership and/or decision-making responsibilities should not be involved in death notifications or routine follow-ups unless there is a specific need or purpose to do so.
  + The policies of the Public Safety Department and Student Life and Engagement should be reviewed and if necessary, reconciled as part of the internal after-action review process.
  + Conduct regular joint training and functional exercises on implementation of this policy.
  + Include notifications as a regular part of TTX’s and full exercises for the appropriate staff and support staff.
  + Be sure personnel know their role.
  + Ensure that there are multiple alternates to serve in each death notification role.

**COMMUNITY RELATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND RESILIENCE**

* Establish communications and information-sharing channels to other internal and external Emergency Operations Center, as time allows during an incident operating period. Consider virtual connectivity (i.e., WebEOC).

**INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY AND RECOVERY EFFORTS**

* Conduct joint training on Family Assistance Center Operations that includes staff from Public Safety and Student Life.

**CAMPUS TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION**

* The upgrade process from Siemens SiPass to Genetec Synergis will not happen overnight but there still needs to be a campus emergency lockdown feature.
  + Immediately configure Siemens SiPass with an emergency lockdown feature that is accessible at Dispatch, the new Security Operations Center, and a location within the police department available for any officer to initiate. This button should also be configured in Genetec before installing any card readers in the system. SRMC recommends using the same button but having it configured to report to both systems simultaneously. Do not use two separate buttons for campus lockdown even though there are two systems. This will create confusion and allow someone to make a mistake.
* Remove the existing dock door handset and replace it with a storeroom function lock. This will remove the ability for staff to place the door in an unlocked state. It does not prevent unlocking the door to gain access; it only prevents the door from being left in an unlocked state.
* Install storeroom function locks on all classrooms throughout the campus. Classroom doors should never be unlocked unless a staff member is gaining access. Install magnetic door holders on each classroom door so that they can be used for propping the doors open in lieu of staff using door wedges. Magnetic door holders can be connected to the emergency lockdown function allowing the doors to close automatically if the campus goes into lockdown. After our assessment, it was identified that MSU

has already upgraded 65% of the classroom locks to thumb-turn-style locks. This doesn’t address the automatic locking of doors during an event, but it does provide the ability for staff and students to lock the door, if necessary, mechanically.

* Identify protection zones, such as Public, Semi-Public, Semi-Private, and Private, and identify campus access control standards around those zones. By installing card access at all buildings and using the defined zones, it enables flexibility and growth to tighten or loosen access to buildings based on time of day and access levels.
* Develop a video surveillance standard along with a Division 28 specification for video surveillance implementations at any building or college on any MSU campus.
* Develop a plan to convert all disparate video systems to the new Genetec platform so that the SOC has the ability to view all cameras, through a single pane of glass, on campus, not just those installed by DPPS.
* Develop a plan to upgrade camera coverage of the campus using technology such as the Panomera® product from Dallmeier. This provides for a single camera with multiple lenses to work within Genetec and appears as if there are multiple cameras installed when in fact, there is only one multi-lens camera.
* Through community outreach efforts, encourage businesses and local residents to share access to their private cameras that provide views beneficial to MSUPD. Genetec supports this model.
* Consider using AI in video systems to enhance your ability to identify abandoned packages, large groups, and high activity in unusual areas at inappropriate times. Advanced video technology can also be used to protect cultural property like public art on and around campus, university art on loan, museum collections, and other university assets. Finally, it is an excellent tool for use by investigators.
* Develop a video retention policy before implementing the new VMS across the organization. The plan should include the following information at a minimum:
  + Storage and recycling procedures for video surveillance footage.
  + Who can view and copy recorded video?
  + Explanation of litigation holds and the process MSU DPPS must follow for the preservation of video in anticipation of litigation.
  + Definition of video retention based on the organization’s needs, best practices, and input from Legal. This should not be less than 30 days.
* Train DPPS staff to search for videos on the different systems until all systems have been converted to Genetec. This should be a written process for each disparate system on campus.
* Develop a video surveillance philosophy for the University that includes expected quality, area of coverage, and monitoring capabilities. This policy should state that if you want to install cameras at MSU it must be coordinated through the DPPS technology team and must conform to MSU video surveillance guidelines and standards and that Colleges are forbidden from installing any video surveillance system that does not conform to these standards. This is not to stop any College from installing video surveillance systems, but it will keep control within DPPS to have access to those systems during emergent situations such as that of February 13th.
* Allocate a dedicated space to support the implementation of an MSU-wide SOC. At a minimum the new SOC should have the following:
  + Access controlled space that limits access to dispatchers, supervisors, and security management. Police officers, detectives, and other DPPS staff should not have access to this space. The SOC door should be closed 100% of the time, and access should be given to those who require access to the space.
  + The workstations should be configured for collaboration with other dispatchers and to view an interactive monitor wall.
  + All ACS and VMS systems across campus should be converted to Genetec, the go-forward platform, immediately so that there are only SiPass and Genetec that need to be monitored by MSU Public Safety.
  + The SOC should be staffed to have no less than two individuals plus a supervisor on duty at all times. During peak times, there should be a third dispatcher to span the standard shifts to support the increased volume.
* Provide campus emergency lockdown buttons at each dispatcher console. Use of these buttons should be guided by policy or procedure regarding who has authority to authorize the lockdown. Currently, it requires a sergeant, or someone of higher rank, to authorize a campus lockdown. The process should include a verbal authorization process using radio communication so the lockdown can be initiated from the field.
* Direct all calls from Call for Assistance stations into the SOC, and as the video system is enhanced, integrate the call initiation with video of the area and call that video to the monitor wall or dispatcher call-up monitor for increased situational awareness.
* Integrate the AVIA phone system to Alertus so emergency messages may be transmitted through all campus desk phone speakers.
* Relocate the Federal Signal Sirens mic and amp to the new SOC, train all dispatchers in its use, create a policy on usage, and test the system monthly after the county emergency management test.

**DOCUMENT ON THE NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS) & THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)**

**National Incident Management System and Incident Command System**

The ICS has been established by the NIMS as the standardized incident organizational structure for the management of all incidents. (FEMA)

## NIMS Guiding Principles

* Flexibility, Standardization, Unity of Effort.
* Applicable across full spectrum of potential incidents and hazard scenarios, regardless of size or complexity.
* Improve coordination and cooperation between responding entities (public, private, internal external).

SRMC suggests the use of a standardized approach, even if it is ICS-like rather than ICS exact. It needs to work, not just be on paper. The policy group (Board of Trustee level) is not typically part of the emergency operations center.

For large-scale emergencies, some members at the top administrative operational level (University senior leadership), may be included. This allows for fast decision-making when one decision has an impact on more than one university pillar and ensures that those at the highest level of the university are part of the solution. It also allows for collaboration without slowing down the process by needing to set up separate meetings.

## NIMS Sections

* Command
* Operations
* Planning
* Logistics
* Finance & Administration.

Responsible for:

* Command and management.
* Preparedness.
* Resource management.
* Communications and information management.
* Supporting technologies.
* Ongoing management and maintenance.

## ICS Features

ICS has several features that make it well suited to managing incidents. These features include:

* Common terminology.
* Organizational resources.
* Manageable span of control.
* Organizational facilities.
* Use of position titles.
* Reliance on an Incident Action Plan.
* Integrated communications.
* Accountability.

Policy groups are part of the off-site incident management structure of NIMS. Policy group members, in this context, would be the Board of Trustees, as well as local/state/federal agency administrators, executives from stakeholder agencies or organizations impacted by and with resources committed to the incident. This may also include representatives from non-governmental organizations such as businesses and volunteer organizations.

Policy groups act as policy-level bodies during incidents, supporting resource prioritization and allocation, and enabling decision- making among the institutional operational leadership who are responsible for managing the incident (e.g., the Incident Commander).

The Board of Trustees would be considering strategic and longer-range issues such as:

* Financial risk.
* Aesthetic risk.
* Reputational concerns.
* Lack of service.
* Transportation and supply resources.
* Longer-range policy changes in safety and security.